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THE Air War College of the United States Air Force is the institution which is probably in the best position in the world to receive, discuss, evaluate, and disseminate thinking on air power. The College is engaged in a program of study, teaching, and research in matters of vital interest to a dynamic and progressive air force. Its student body, Graduate Study Group, faculty, and lecturers all are engaged in this enterprise. The College originates ideas and studies opinions, hypotheses, and concepts originating both within itself and from external sources. It synthesizes knowledge thus gained into doctrine and principles for the proper employment of air power.

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Our purpose in initiating the Air War College Study series on even this modest scale is to advance knowledge of air power and to assist the development of doctrine generally throughout the United States Air Force.



R. C. WILSON
Major General, USAF
Commandant

1 February 1954

Approved For Release 2001/08/29 : CIA-RDP78-04718A001800100002-1

Approved For Release 2001/08/29 : CIA-RDP78-04718A001800100002-1

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White House

STRATEGY-MAKING MACHINERY

1952, 1954

COLONEL WENDELL E. LITTLE, USAR

Introduction by the Editor

**AIR WAR COLLEGE STUDIES
NUMBER TWO**

*Air University Press
Air University*

Approved For Release 2001/08/29 : CIA-RDP78-04718A001800100002-1
for official use only

Approved For Release 2001/08/29 : CIA-RDP78-04718A001800100002-1

*Published
in July 1954*

*by
Air University Press
Maxwell Air Force Base
Alabama*

*Established in Headquarters Air University, 1 October 1953,
to Advance
the Science of Air Power*

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FOREWORD

WHEN, during the spring of 1953, the Air War College students read digests of their theses before the assembled college, one such presentation "brought down the house." The applause was in part appreciation for a piece of research well done and a general agreement with the findings; it was also an expression of exasperation, which feeling was fairly general, especially among airmen. This is the thesis upon which that presentation was based.

The basic paper was a study of our top-rung machinery for making grand strategy under President Truman and was completed just as a new administration was taking over. The Air War College was anxious to learn what progress had been made during the first year of the Eisenhower administration. It, therefore, asked "Tex" Little to write an addendum to his original thesis.

The two in combination are here published in the belief that the study should be made available to others.

The reader will not be satisfied, for the story is not complete. But he will be pleased to note real progress.



R. C. WILSON
Major General, USAF
Commandant

1 April 1954

INTRODUCTION

BY THE EDITOR

THE United States, at the conclusion of its "tumultuous demobilization" in 1945-46, found itself in a dilemma. As it contemplated its postwar posture among nations, it was torn between conflicting desire and duty.

There was a deep seated desire to be free of international responsibility. There was a persistent longing for "the good old days" of isolated security, when Britain did the worrying about "balance of power," and when the young United States enjoyed protection afforded by intervening seas upon which rode only friendly navies. But this protection was now gone—gone indeed long before those awesome events took place at Pearl Harbor, Hiroshima, and Bikini. Yet, despite the purport of those events, the nostalgic yearning persisted—affecting foreign policy.

There was at the same time a stabbing conscience which disturbingly said, "Get on with winning the peace! You must! This time you must!" And the young giant of the West, the "Arsenal of Democracy" in all that that term connotes, knew that it should be about its business of vigorously promoting freedom, justice, and socio-economic progress "everywhere in the world." Here too was a persistent force—a persistent call to duty.

Could this exasperating dilemma—this conflict between desire and duty—be resolved by compromise? Was there not some middle ground between isolationism and internationalism, some place where Uncle Sam might acknowledge his obligation to the Four Freedoms while following a policy of "live and let live"? Could he not buy some time while the dust of World War II settled? Would this not, after all, be the wisest course to follow?

Here public opinion divided; indeed, it fragmented. The people looked to Washington. And Washington looked back to the people. It always had. But now public opinion was

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quite difficult to gauge. Most people were saying nothing. They simply could not reach national decisions on international affairs because they did not know enough. This very dilemma created from among the people a school of neo-isolationists who did express themselves. On the other hand, there were those who were convinced that a negative approach to international responsibility had never succeeded. "Compromise between conflicting desire and duty can be no more than an expedient," they contended, "a dangerous expedient."

This latter element of the people pointed more or less frantically at the specter of a militant, amoral Marxist-Leninist-Stalinism stalking Mother Earth. They pleaded with their fellow democrats to awaken to the true significance of Russian communism. "Temporizing on our part," this element of the people held, "can be but a show of weakness. The Russians are the greatest chess players on earth. In every move they make they are showing their appreciation of the idiom that an offense is the best defense. But this is no mere chess match; the stakes in this contest are the sum-total of all that we hold dear. What is your plan, Washington? Can you get off the purely defensive? What is your grand strategy? Who is making U.S. grand strategy anyway? The State Department? The Pentagon? The White House?"

The people as a whole still looked to Washington. And Washington looked back to the people.

Eventually, in July 1947, there appeared in *Foreign Affairs* an article by "X," entitled "Sources of Soviet Conduct." In this anonymous piece, the planning staff of the U.S. State Department appeared to be sending up a trial balloon. Yet here, for all its timorous appearance, was a pronouncement of what this State Department group thought should be United States foreign policy *vis-a-vis* the Soviet plan of action. We would "firmly contain" Russian communism until it should give up its ambitions and wither away. The people read reproductions of X's article in popular publications. Some raised eyebrows; others frowned; most shrugged and went about their chosen occupations.

At this point, had we space here to spare, a chronology of the Cold War, beginning prior to 1947, should be reviewed. The "ebbings and flowings" of the Communist movement would be shown. It quickly would be seen that like all other

tyrannical forces in history there were no ebbs—no retreats on any front—except before the use of physical force or the definite threat or ultimatum to employ violence.

In this chronology there would appear some red-letter dates. Among them would be those having to do with the Berlin Blockade, the Greek "guerrilla war," the Truman Doctrine, the retreat of Chiang Kai-shek, the Soviet action in the UN, the demise of freedom in Czechoslovakia, the Marshall Plan, NATO, EDC, the Korean War, and wars in Indo-China and Malaya. Scattered throughout would be items having to do with consolidation of Communist conquests in Central Europe and in Asia. The chronology would contain also the red-letter dates which designated the shocking announcements that Soviet scientists had exploded atom bombs and then a thermonuclear device.

These latter items, with the accompanying talk about "kilotons" and then "megatons" and "megadeaths," seemed for a time to have had a stunning effect upon American public opinion. All this—all these complications—all the various probabilities—all the horrible possibilities! The people looked to Washington. . . .

If there had developed an immediate postwar dilemma, it was all the more compounded now, for everything else was compounded. The United States was slowly but surely being forced against its will to take a stand—to plan carefully a strong foreign policy and to plan to be able to take quick violent action should such become necessary in the implementation of that policy. The United States wanted just to "live and let live;" it found that that was no longer possible. It preferred to "muddle through" international problems; now it began to realize that it had been dragged into a diplomatic struggle of unprecedented significance. It had always loved the looseness of its democratic structure, and it wanted to remain "free and easy." Now, challenged by totalitarian rigid efficiency, it was being forced to centralize authority. Only thus could it move quickly and effectively to parry, to spar, to block, to counterattack.

Meantime, how much of a counterattack would the people stand for? How much was necessary? Just enough to continue to "firmly contain" as in the case of Korea? But then what of Indo-China where we were not very firmly containing? And what of the Red threat to Thailand and Burma and

Malaya? One could count a full dozen prospective "brush fires" along the southern borders of the Red Heartland, and any of them could become as bloody an affair as had been the indecisive Korean War.

And there was a large part of Europe yet unconquered by the Reds. It was American determination that it should remain unconquered.

How much manpower was available for this kind of a foreign policy? How much training would be required? Would universal military training be necessary? How much materiel would it take to equip all the people required to man this multithousand-mile-long peripheral Maginot Line? And how long would this program remain in effect? Meantime, what would be happening to the American economy? What would be happening to bourgeois democracy here and elsewhere? Was not economic blood-letting a part of the Communist program expressed as early as 1850 in Karl Marx's *Address From the Central Authority*? Are not answers to these basic questions found in scores of more recent Communist pronouncements of intent such as that in Stalin's 1939 *Report to the Eighteenth Party Congress* when he stated (in a different but applicable context) that Communist expansion would be pursued until after "the capitalist encirclement is liquidated and a socialist encirclement takes its place"? Were they not answered as recently as 5 October 1952 in Malenkov's *Report to the Nineteenth Party Congress*? Then he said:

"Comrades, the Soviet state is no longer a lone oasis surrounded by capitalist countries. We are moving forward together with the great Chinese people (prolonged applause), together with the many millions of the People's Democracies and the German Democratic Republic. (Prolonged applause.)

There is no force in the world that can halt the advance of Soviet society. Our cause is invincible. We must keep our hand firmly on the helm and steer our course undeterred by provocation or intimidation." (Loud and prolonged applause.)

In the face of this inexorable challenge, the United States was being forced to re-examine its policy of "firm containment." It had to do this in conjunction with a re-evaluation of hard military facts. This must be dictated not by service bias but by cold logic. Inevitably the United States was being forced toward abandonment of the temporizing "balanced-

force concept" and toward creation of an absolutely invincible air power. Invincibility here of necessity implied the holding and supplying of advanced air bases. Invincibility, in the face of Soviet obduracy, dictated that this air power should mean: capability of delivering anywhere the post-absolute weapon.

But who was to make a decision or a series of decisions here? One thinks of all the major factors: Soviet intentions and actions, United States economy, military capabilities, and the desires and intentions of our Allies.

There is a myriad of other unresolved questions—all related—some more closely than others. Most of them revolve (clockwise) around the bulging membrane of the Russo-Marxian zygote: What about Japan and her future? What about Chiang Kai-shek and Formosa? What of trade with Communist China? And of the recognition of the "Chinese People's Republic" and its being given a seat with veto power in the United Nations? What are we going to do about Southeast Asia? And what about our relations with India? And Pakistan? And the whole of the Southwest Pacific? What are we going to do if the Russians, through the Tudeh Party, yet take over Iran? What about the whole of the Middle East—its oil, its Arab-Jewish controversy, its Suez Canal problem, its championing of nationalist aspirations along the North African littoral with its naval and Strategic Air Command bases? And there are the thousand-and-one problems of the European and British areas. Finally, lest we forget, there is the Western Hemisphere, from Patagonia to Guatemala to Thule.

And there is Eniwetok! And one thinks of prospective megadeaths!!

And there is an appalling lack of intelligence on what is transpiring behind the Iron Curtain! But there are Soviet strategic bomber bases.

And what about our own information security problem?

All this and more too.

The people, of necessity, are confused. They are overwhelmed.

They have only one choice now. Like trusting children they must place all this business—foreign policy, strategy, and executive action—in the hands of their experts.

They look to Washington. . . .

But to whom in Washington?

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U.S. Machinery
for Integration of
Politico-Military Policies
in 1952

Approved For Release 2001/08/29 : CIA-RDP78-04718A001800100002-1

1. NEED FOR MERGER OF POLITICO-MILITARY POLICIES

HISTORICALLY, at least up to the end of World War II, the United States made a black-and-white distinction between peace and war. It produced diplomats for conducting international relations in time of peace and military leaders for planning and conducting campaigns in time of war.¹ There was no machinery to insure the proper balance of emphasis among military and political considerations of national strategy. It was almost traditional for those who conducted our foreign policy to speak from potential rather than actual military strength-in-being. In many cases our potential strength was not even indigenous; we were depending on some external friendly force or we were bluffing or perhaps both. Surely, in 1823, Secretary of State John Quincy Adams and the President promulgated the Monroe Doctrine in the full knowledge that we could not enforce its letter or spirit in case of challenge. They were gambling largely on the known attitude of George Canning and the British Parliament. More than a century later, when we had an unmistakable political obligation to defend the Philippines against all comers, our military planners worked on the assumption that we could not even hold Corregidor against a determined assault.

This tradition of separation of politico-military considerations plus the habit of speaking from potential rather than actual military strength-in-being may have stood us in good stead in the past. Surely we have enjoyed a large measure of good luck in our foreign dealings. But the facts of life

¹The following is from the U.S. Military Academy textbook, *World's Military History*, by West Point's late Professor William A. Mitchell (Harrisburg: Military Service Publishing Company, 1931, 1935, 1937, 1940), 1940 edition, p. 2.

It is to be noted that war begins when the diplomats have failed. This is the point most often not considered. When the diplomat, the statesman, the executive have been unable to prevent the war, they step aside (or should step aside) and let the soldiers handle the military situation in the field.

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suddenly have undergone a drastic mutation produced by atomic fission and fusion. Faced squarely with this technological revolution, and with Kremlin theory and practice, two factors in the conduct of United States foreign affairs stand out in bold relief: diplomats can no longer ignore the military facts of life; and our military leaders, despite a strong tradition to the contrary, must henceforth assume their share of responsibility for diplomacy.²

The traditional American concept of a black-and-white distinction between peace and war was reflected in the organizational structure of our Federal Government in the early 1940's. There was no machinery for integration of political and military considerations of grand strategy—only one overworked man who simply could not carry this great burden alone. In the early stages of World War II the diplomatic arm of the Government virtually abdicated its powers and responsibilities to the politically untrained military leaders. This failure to integrate politico-military policies was illustrated tragically at Yalta when the President, heeding an exclusively stytic military judgment, virtually handed Eastern Asia to the Kremlin.

In 1945, as the war in Europe drew to a close, Soviet troops raced for Prague and Berlin, symbols of political prestige, while our highest military officers were loath to hazard American lives for purely political purposes. General Bradley in his memoirs had this to say of the British insistence that the Americans take Berlin before the Russians: "As soldiers we looked naively on this British inclination to complicate the war with political foresight and nonmilitary objectives."³ Can it be that our military leaders, of all people, failed to appreciate the true significance of Karl von Clausewitz's dictum (now trite) that war is the continuation of policy by other means?⁴ This question is all the more pointed

²For interesting discussions of this or immediately related subjects cf: William H. Hessler, *Operation Survival*, New York: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1949; Col. G. C. Reinhardt, and Lt. Col. William R. Kintner, "The need for a National Staff," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, Vol. 78, July 1952; Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Lessons of World War II's Mistakes," *Commentary*, October 1952; B. H. Liddell-Hart, *The Revolution in Warfare*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1947; and Paul G. Hoffman, *Peace Can Be Won*, New York: Doubleday & Co., 1951.

³Omar N. Bradley, *A Soldier's Story*, New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1951, p. 536.

⁴The opening paragraph of Colonel Joseph I. Greene's "Forward" to the Infantry Journal Press's edition of Karl von Clausewitz, *On War*: Washington, 1950, p. xi, follows:

An acquaintance who knew books but not the Army once asked me why *On War*, by Karl von Clausewitz, was not a standard textbook, or at least a book of required reference, at the Command and General Staff School and the Army War College. The fact was that the courses at these institutions dealt mainly with the warfare of the future in terms of present thought on war, rather than with wars of the past, and that even the classics of military history were little used in the instruction. But I could say that these two highest schools of our Army, and the equivalent schools of other nations were in a sense themselves an application of the ideas and methods of Karl von Clausewitz as expressed in this book, which is his major work.

in the face of Churchill's continuous insistence on the political significance of military action. He knew from long experience that wars are means to political ends; and military victory, if it is to bear political fruits, must be shaped to those ends.⁵

Lack of wisdom at the peace table conferences has been blamed for failure to secure a "just and lasting peace"; but, in truth, the seeds of future wars are sown by the conduct of the fighting prior to the peace talks. As war draws to a close the primary function of the military becomes more political in nature, and at times such considerations should outweigh technical military aspects. This is true because the conditions under which the physical fighting stops tend to dictate or control the relative power positions at the peace conferences, and the terms of the military armistice often become permanent.

Prior to and during World War II there was no American machinery for the integration of all the military and political aspects of a single grand strategy. That the President felt the need for such assistance is illustrated by his complaint after the Casablanca Conference that "No member of the Joint Chief of Staff knows how to plan ahead in other than military affairs." If Roosevelt had had an organization to serve up for his approval well-thought-out answers to the many politico-military questions, it is possible that some of the more obvious (in retrospect) errors of the last war could have been avoided. For example, Stalin seems to have been better advised on the unfortunate formula of "unconditional surrender" than was Roosevelt.⁶

It may be argued also that, on combined politico-military grounds, an Allied invasion of the Balkans should have been undertaken.⁷ The U.S. Joint Chiefs opposed Churchill's repeated pressure for such operations on purely military grounds, and Stalin strongly objected for reasons that became apparent at the end of the war.⁸ In fact, the Soviets conducted a vigorous propaganda campaign in the United States to prevent an Allied campaign up through the Balkans. The American strategy in Europe during World War II actually opened up all of Eastern Europe to seizure of the

⁵Cf. Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe*, Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday & Co., 1948, Chapter 20; Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War—Triumph and Tragedy*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1953, Chapter 8.

⁶Robert Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, New York, Harper, 1950, p. 782.

⁷For example: Chester Wilmot, *The Struggle for Europe*, New York: Harper, 1952, p. 453.

⁸Sherwood, op. cit., p. 780.

Soviet armies. The great defeats suffered by the West in the first two years of the Cold War (1945-1947) were ordained by the United States decision to fight the Germans in France instead of grabbing as much of Central and Eastern Europe as possible by an attack through the Balkans. Seeking simply to annihilate the enemy, we quite forgot that the purpose of war is to create a more tolerable and stable equilibrium in the world community than that which existed before resort to armed conflict had occurred. The basic fact is that the United States had no integrated political-military strategy during or at the end of World War II, and consequently has been forced to handle almost all the postwar problems on an *ad hoc* basis. Even the Marshall Plan was essentially an *ad hoc* solution for what we hoped would be a temporary problem.

The examples of a demonstrated lack of an integrated American position on world strategy can be cited almost indefinitely. But, more important, our tendency to separate world strategy into neat and separate packages—one for each department of the Government—has contributed to our failure to show a full understanding of the nature of international conflict. Such conflict goes on continuously, and all forms of human behavior are involved. The shadings between peace and war and the instruments used by nations to achieve or to preserve power are becoming increasingly indistinct. We realized, three or four years too late, our own naiveté at the end of World War II when the nation deliberately disintegrated its military forces with almost no voice raised in protest. This was because we failed to understand that after the defeat of the Axis the struggle would only be continued in different forms and with new power relationships.

It is not a strained concept to suggest that the existence of a well-trained group of politico-military strategists, properly placed in the American government, might have provided more enlightenment, or at least the basic doctrine and knowledge which would have enabled a wise President to assert his historic role as both an awakener of public opinion and an initiator of bold policies.⁹ Historically the nation's

⁹Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Conduct of Foreign Policy" in Aspects of American Government, London: The Hansard Society, 1950, p. 113.

organization for national defense has been so shackled in the grip of the past that only threat of grave catastrophe could release it.¹⁰ The urgency of finding a solution to this problem was emphasized in the immediate postwar period by the cold facts of our responsibility for world leadership in a bipolar world. Victory awaited that side which should make the best use of its substance. A terrible defeat was the alternative.

It was to satisfy the crying need for a merger of political (including socio-economic factors) and military policies that the National Security Council (NSC) was brought into existence by the National Defense Act of 1947.

2. ORIGIN AND FUNCTION OF NSC

THE National Security Council's origin is found in the United States cabinet, in the kitchen cabinet, and in SWNCC. This latter, "State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee," was a World War II expedient which had proved itself under fire to be worthy of preservation.* Strengthened and elevated, this agency might indeed supplant the cabinet in the performance of one function—the formulation of foreign policy.

The "integration of domestic, foreign and military policies relating to National Security" is the stated purpose of NSC. These are the words of the act of Congress which brought NSC into existence. Actually the Council can be just a co-ordinating board or it can be an all-powerful grand-strategy planning *sanctum sanctorum*. That is for the President to say.

¹⁰Cf. Otto Nelson, Jr., *National Security and the General Staff*, Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1946, p. 569.
* [After "Unification" SWNCC became known as SANACC (State, Army, Navy, Air Coordinating Committee).—Ed.]

chart 1

National Security Council

and its Agencies
1952

THE PRESIDENT

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

The President . . . Harry S. Truman
The Vice President . . . Alben W. Barkley
The Secretary of State . . . Dean G. Acheson
The Secretary of Defense . . . Robert A. Lovett
The Director for Mutual Security . . . W. Averell Harriman
The Chairman, National Security Resources Board . . . Vacant
(Jack O. Gorrie 1951)

Others at the direction of the President, including always the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff . . . General Omar N. Bradley

Executive Secretary:
A civilian appointed by the President
to head the NSC Staff . . . James S. Lay, Jr.

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U.S. Air Force
Director of Intelligence, Atomic Energy
Commission
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Group, Joint Staff

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The Secretary of Defense
The Director for Mutual Security
The Chairman, National Security Resources Board
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Director of Defense Mobilization
The Joint Chiefs of Staff, and
The Director of Central Intelligence
Others at the direction of the President
The staff is headed by the Executive Secretary

NSC STAFF ASSISTANTS

Officials designated by
the respective members
of the Senior NSC Staff
and headed by a Coordinator
to assist the Senior NSC
Staff on a full-time basis

NSC Ad Hoc STAFF GROUPS

Established by the Senior
NSC Staff from time to time
for special projects
and studies.


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Harry S. Truman



Alben W. Barkley



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James S. Felt
Executive Secretary

Deputy
Executive Secretary

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Dean G. Acheson
State



Robert A. Lovett
Defense



W. Averell Harriman
Mutual Security



Jack O. Gorrie
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Walter B. Smith



Allen W. Dulles

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General of the Army
Omar N. Bradley

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Approved For Release 2001/08/29 : CIA-RDP78-04718A001800100002-1

3. STRUCTURE AND OPERATING PROCEDURE

THE organization structure and functions of Mr. Truman's NSC are shown in Chart 1. The membership consists of the President, as chairman, the Vice-President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Mutual Security, the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board, and other secretaries and under secretaries of departments when appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. It is to be noted that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) are two important organizations which are directly subordinate to the National Security Council. The Senior NSC Staff, headed by the Executive Secretary of the Council, functions to coordinate the development of an integrated working group position on the basis of the views of the various agencies concerned. To the extent that agreements are reached by the working group, they are normally ratified by the Council at a regular meeting; otherwise the Council may attempt to resolve disagreements. Failing in this, the case goes to the President for decision.

The members of the Senior NSC Staff are themselves the designated representatives of the several members of the Council, so that the members of the Senior Staff are the alternates (on the working level) of the legal members of the Council. Members of the Senior Staff serve NSC as an "additional duty." They owe their primary loyalty to their own departments or agencies—not to the NSC. The full-time staff hired by and working for the NSC is relatively small and overshadowed by the partisans of the departments. The personnel resources of the Council are limited, both as to the number of full-time people available and as to the direct in-

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terest and authority of the part-time workers to function as a true National Staff.

The first Executive Secretary of the Council, Mr. Sidney Souers, felt that he should "never take sides on any policy issue, since this would jeopardize his role as a neutral coordinator."¹¹ The *modus operandi* was to "keep the subject under discussion until the disputes are resolved."¹² These operating methods continued under President Truman without substantial change. This no doubt insures full consideration of all possible viewpoints, but it also stagnates the decision-making process except where the President personally steps in. A policy decision taken without adequate discussion and consideration can hurt grievously; but it is equally wrong, especially for a nation looked to for world leadership, to lose situations by default of any policy. The latter has been more damaging than the former in the peace efforts of this nation during the past decade.

There is no doubt that the NSC has worked better than any previous organization established for the same purpose. It is probably the "most orderly and effective policy-making process the country has ever had."¹³ Its merit is judged, not in terms of how well it has integrated politico-military strategy, but on the fact that it has functioned at all in this heretofore neglected field. In any event, the problems facing America today are more demanding than at any time in history, and the effectiveness of its organization to win the peace must be judged in the light of today's situation of Cold War (with at least one "hot spot") waged by the U.S.S.R. with a completely integrated ideology bent on world domination. With this requirement we may turn to an examination of some of the organizational arrangements of the NSC and how these affect its ability to accomplish its all-important job.

¹¹The New York Times Magazine, April 24, 1949, p. 61.

¹²See U.S. News and World Report, April 2, 1948, p. 43.

¹³John Fischer, Master Plan, U.S.A., New York: Harper, 1951.

4. A FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM

HERE is a basic and fundamental problem facing the National Security Council. It is, in fact, a collegiate structure. That is, authority is vested in the group as a whole. But in actual operation its chairman, the President, has had so many other demands on his time that the Council has been without a real full-time boss. Without strong full-time leadership, each department representative on NSC tends to hold back problems or issues that he can dispose of unilaterally (to his own satisfaction). Even after "decisions" are reached by the Council, each agency is largely its own judge of what is to be done about them. Some of the problems cited later in this paper will illustrate unilateral action by both the Departments of State and Defense. The current (1952) system of follow-up used by the staff of the NSC is limited to the perfunctory requirement of a status report from the "action" departments. This has the virtue of making the several departments conscious of their responsibility for national unity through NSC. But it does not mean that NSC has yet been cloaked with real authority.

The typically American tendency of high officials to regard their prime responsibility as performance of their own narrow function—at whatever cost to the over-all objectives of the nation—has been evident in the NSC. The system of departmentalism in the United States Government is so embedded that department heads tend to feel no accountability for over-all policy on activities affecting other departments.¹⁴ Such segmentation of interest is frequently in conflict with the President's responsibility for the whole public interest. This conflict is all the more dangerous in the absence of strong leadership from the President. It is the contention of some writers that the "lack of intellectual leader-

¹⁴For excellent discussion of this point, see: Herman Miles Somers, *Presidential Agency*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950, p. 215.

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ship" by President Truman has left the Council "in desperate need of compelling, farsighted leadership."¹⁵ Whether or not this charge is fully justified it appears to be a fact that there is a fundamental problem in NSC which is yet to be resolved. Some method of subordinating selfish department interests to overriding national interests must be found. This weakness of the U.S. cabinet system (as contrasted with the British system) should not be perpetuated in the promising NSC.

**5. THE VOICE OF THE MILITARY IN
NATIONAL STRATEGY**

THAT the views of the nation's top military men should have weight in strategic decisions of the NSC is without question. The military plans of the JCS must be designed to execute the military aspects of the over-all strategic policies and programs formulated by the NSC. Conversely, national policies and indeed the whole posture of the nation's foreign programs must reflect military strength in the appropriate form.

Just what that military strength is, or what it must be to offset a prospective enemy's military strength, is a question which should be answered by our top military chiefs. There is one viewpoint that their answer should be unanimous. In opposition is the viewpoint that unanimity here might well involve compromise so "watered down" that weakness is bound to result. This opposing viewpoint would call for full expression of service bias before NSC for its decision as to which of several alternatives should be implemented.

Meantime, the problem exists, and JCS representation in NSC is faulty. Neither its representatives on the Senior NSC Staff nor the Chairman himself (as able individuals as they may be personally) can speak for and fully commit this

¹⁵John Fischer, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

collegiate body which more than often actually has no collegiate opinion.

Competent Washington observers have characterized the JCS representative as a "Russian" delegate. He can only say in effect: "The views expressed here are of interest to the JCS and I shall report them to that body. When the JCS has considered the matter I shall make its position available to you."¹⁶ The trouble is that the JCS consideration and decision is taken in the sanctuary of the Pentagon insulated from nonmilitary persons who "cannot understand fully the military problems involved" and is usually a flat position which none but the entire collegiate body itself can change.

The JCS has no doubt suffered for want of guidance from the NSC, but the latter has also suffered from a certain aloofness on the part of the JCS.¹⁷ The ritualism of JCS procedures, the general mysticism that surrounds that body, and the attitude on the part of some of its staff that only the JCS can possibly understand "military" problems has not endeared the "Pentagon's College of Cardinals" to some of the "civilian" agencies in Washington who are necessarily concerned with politico-military strategy, planning, and operation.

Contrary to our tendency toward separation of authority and responsibility in governmental affairs, it must now be clear that "under modern conditions military questions are so interwoven with economic, political, social, and technological phenomena that it is doubtful if one can speak of a purely military strategy."¹⁸ As Clausewitz pointed out, a purely military judgment is "unpermissible and even harmful."¹⁹ Especially in recent years we have come to realize that only "over-all guidance can coordinate global warfare fought as bitterly in the realms of ideas or economics and in the 'underground' as in the ceaseless clash of armed forces."²⁰

¹⁶This opinion has been expressed to the writer by an important Washington official who has had actual experience on the staff of both the PSB and the Senior NSC Staff.

¹⁷F. Gervasi, *Big Government*, New York: Whittlesey, 1949, p. 279.

¹⁸Edward M. Earle, *Makers of Modern Strategy*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944, p. xi.

¹⁹Karl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1950, p. 599.

²⁰Reinhardt and Kintner, op. cit., p. 722, ff.

6. A SINGLE VOICE OF AUTHORITY

A MERICA'S position of world leadership in an era of cold war has emphasized the fact that those who must speak for the nation, whether in uniform or mufti, must speak for the nation as a whole. Nothing vitiates confidence in our ability to lead more than uncoordinated statements and actions which may be contradictory when applied to a single country abroad. United States military commanders overseas cannot avoid political considerations. In some cases they have become the political spokesman as well as the military executors of United States foreign policy. This is, of course, a violation of the theory of civilian control. In the United States, representatives of the State Department are often faced with decisions which should be based upon military factors. Such decisions, having been made, in turn affect the military arrangements of our Government and the resultant dearth of authoritative and integrated long-range policies and plans does not ease the work of either our top military or diplomatic officials.

National, no less than military, unity of command is essential to control the resources of the nation—resources which are required for hot or cold war. Such authority is actually vested in the President, either as the military commander in chief or as the political head of the nation. But there is no single strong staff to assist the President in the supremely important task of achieving national unity of command. There is a superabundance of staff elements in Washington; but in all that great maze, a strong integrated national staff is not available to put the final picture together in such form that the President can act on it with effective results.

7. THE OVERSEAS COMMAND PROBLEM

PRIOR to the days of large-scale foreign aid, when the only American troops in foreign countries were part of the attaché system, the United States ambassador to a foreign government was clearly the senior representative of the Government, and he alone spoke as the representative of the President. In recent years, with the appearance of other high officials to administer economic aid and with military theater commanders ensconced in the same country or city, questions arose as to the relative positions and relationships of the American officials in various foreign countries. In the same way that we refused to allow political considerations to interfere with military operations during the war, there has been a reluctance on the part of economic specialists to permit political considerations to "violate" the autonomy of economic operations of the Mutual Security Agency (MSA).²¹

The problem of overseas administration of the Departments of State and Defense and of the MSA was aired in the Senate hearings on the Mutual Security Act of 1951. During these hearings Senator Lodge complained that the NSC should coordinate the activities of the operating agencies and fit them into our foreign policies instead of leaving the job to a separate interdepartmental coordinating group known as the International Security Affairs Committee (ISAC). The ISAC had been created by executive order of the President to coordinate certain overseas operations and to fit them into foreign policies. The Senate hearings show that the committee was less than a complete success.²²

As finally enacted, the Mutual Security Act of 1951 placed

²¹Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Lessons of World War II's Mistakes," *Commentary*, October, 1952.

²²Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations and Military Services On S-1762, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1951.

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the Director of MSA on the NSC and required the President "to prescribe procedures to assure coordination . . . under the Chief of the United States Diplomatic Mission." This, of course, did not solve the problem but did recognize it and directed the President to take the necessary action. But the problem has not been solved. As late as December 1952, a Congressional committee noted "the relative poor coordination, and in some instances, virtually warfare, . . . between the United States policy officials in a country representing our Mutual Security Agency and the United States ambassador."²³ The report further stated that foreign Governments often do not know to whom to turn if they get conflicting words from two men of equal or relatively equal rank.

8. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD

THE current [January, 1953—Ed.] national effort *vis-a-vis* the Soviets is in two parts: to conduct a cold war, and to prepare for a general war. Responsible officials, including President Eisenhower [just inaugurated.—Ed.], have contended that the Cold War properly conducted is a "chance to gain a victory without casualties, to win a contest that can quite literally save the peace."²⁴ It has been contended that the Cold War, now upon us, holds our fate perhaps even more than the shooting war everyone dreads.²⁵ But for a chance of success in the Cold War, our foreign policy must be adapted to a cold-war strategy that is unified and coherent.²⁶

In an effort to achieve coordination of the disparate resources of the departments and agencies responsible for various psychological operations, the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) was created by executive directive of 4 April 1951. In simple terms the PSB was to be a sort of general staff to plan and supervise the conduct of the cold war,

²³The New York Times, December 7, 1952, p. 51.

²⁴The New York Times, January 11, 1953, p. 1.

²⁵Heasler, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

²⁶The New York Times, January 11, 1953, p. 1.

leaving to the Pentagon the responsibility for plans and preparations for a general war. One of the basic reasons for creating the Board was that no other point in the Government could provide the coordination and guidance for the efforts that had sprung up in several departments of the Government to imitate the Soviets by use of psychological and other forms of unorthodox warfare in support of our national policies.

The PSB consists of the Undersecretary of State, the Undersecretary of Defense, and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and operates under a staff director who is responsible for the day-by-day work of the Board. Within the Departments of State and Defense and in the CIA are staff elements to backstop and support the members of the PSB when wearing their PSB hats as distinguished from those related to their normal duties. The concept of the membership of the Board was that its members would be men who enjoyed such prestige that the operating agencies would consider guidance approved by the Board as being mandatory. This was justified on the basis that the major psychological operations are conducted by either the Department of State, the Department of Defense, or the CIA, the undersecretaries of which (or the director in the case of CIA), constitute the membership of the Board. But prestige alone has not been enough. Nobody on the Board is satisfied that the job is being done as effectively as it might if a full-time staff were concentrating on it under the direction of a competent chief with direct access to the Chief Executive.²⁷

The original concept was that the PSB would start where the NSC left off, the former promulgating broad national policies and the latter adopting specific objectives, lines of action, and programs. To the extent that the NSC has failed to do its job, the PSB must either substitute its own policies or stagnate. In practice it is difficult to distinguish between the actual functions of the two agencies. This similarity is supported by the fact that, for the most part, the same officials of State, Defense, or CIA deal with the psychological-warfare problems being considered by NSC or the PSB; the latter is, in effect, another echelon concerned with part of the over-all problem. And the nature of the primary problem of the PSB (cold war) is such that specific programs and

²⁷Ibid., p. 53, col. 2.

lines of action can only be adopted within the framework of definite national objectives and policies which are the responsibility of the NSC.

The directive creating the PSB limited it to planning, co-ordinating, and promulgating national guidance for psychological operations (which were to be conducted by other operating agencies) and to evaluating the national psychological warfare effort. Under its first director, Gordon Gray, the former Secretary of the Army, the Board got off to a good start and initially confined itself to its primary tasks. As the staff grew, and especially after Gray resigned to resume the presidency of the University of North Carolina, the temptation to get closer to "operations" at the expense of the more difficult mundane job of digging out, weighing, and formulating basic psychological programs, seemed to get the best of the staff. It is much more interesting to "run operations" in the psychological-warfare field than it is to do the mean, tough job of forging out realistic doctrine, concepts, and plans in consonance with the foreign policies and the military posture of the nation. The current director of the PSB has a real job to force his staff to develop and allocate the guns and "ammo" of the cold war and to let others "pull the triggers."

The Board soon experienced some of the same difficulties as the NSC in getting its "decisions" executed. Although the Undersecretary of Defense is a member of the PSB, the JCS does not feel bound to accept decisions of the Board that are "military in nature." The JCS has been jealous in guarding its exclusive channel of command to the overseas theater commanders, so that decisions of the Board that may require the attention or action of theater commanders must be reconsidered *de novo* by the JCS. Small wonder that Washington is full of overworked staff officers busily preparing the "position" of their agency on matters that have been "decided" weeks before.

9. SOME DEFECTS OF THE NSC

THE essential fact is that the NSC, which is the key agency in the entire security structure for the United States, has not fully accomplished its purpose. It has undoubtedly been of value in achieving politico-military integration in contrast to the dearth of integration prior to 1947. But its accomplishments are largely limited to dealing with matters of immediate urgency, and it has not provided the operating departments with comprehensive guidance in the form of clear statements of current or long-range policies.²⁸ As a result, the President is seriously handicapped in carrying out his responsibilities to recommend a balanced and comprehensive security program to Congress and the people.²⁹

An example of failure to attain a single strategic position for the nation concerns our relations with Formosa. In 1948, as a result of events on the mainland of China, the JCS decided that Formosa was of strategic importance to the United States.³⁰ But there were no available troops to defend the island, so the JCS told the State Department that Formosa must be held by diplomatic means until troops could be made available. The State Department was unwilling to commit United States prestige to the defense of Formosa because it was too obvious that any strong diplomatic language designed to keep the Chinese Communists out of Formosa was to bluff.³¹ So the world's most modern nation floundered along for months without any machinery to resolve its policies and strategies on what, in terms of world affairs, should not have been among its more difficult problems.

The NSC has given attention to the need for increasing

²⁸Gervasi, op. cit., p. 276.

²⁹U.S. News and World Report, December 23, 1949, p. 38.

³⁰Honorable Dean Rusk, lecture delivered to the Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, October 13, 1952.

³¹Lec. cit.

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the priority of America's effort in the cold war. But it has not provided the guidance or impetus required to launch this effort on a scale comparable to that of the enemy, much less of proportions sufficient to win. The American concept of "open covenants openly arrived at" has made us slow to adopt some of the covert methods which are the basic tactics of the enemy. Our concepts of a free press have made us slow to realize that the subversion of influential foreign newspapers, in order to influence policy, has become almost standard procedure in modern diplomacy.³² But despite these difficulties there must be more positive and less abstract guidance from our top strategic planners. It is not enough to say "roll back the iron curtain;" those who must plan and direct the complicated and interrelated cold war operations must have more of the "What," the "Where," the "When," and the "How" in the same manner as these guidances are characteristic of military plans for general war. Such guidance must come from the NSC since these operations require synchronized support and action by several departments of the Government.

There is great danger in the failure to equip the President with the assistance he needs to act responsibly and effectively. We cannot afford to rely on "Great Men" who can meet their responsibilities without adequate assistance and organizational equipment. The stakes are too high. We must provide the tools and machinery to minimize the possibility of paralysis at the center of the Government.³³ The need to improve existing machinery is recognized by such statesmen as Bernard Baruch who, in a lecture at the Air War College in March 1950, emphasized the need for a general staff for the President to "develop a global strategy for peace making." Mr. Baruch declared that our greatest single need was for a "GHQ for the whole of the Cold War." He felt that the NSC members were already overworked and could not meet this need. In the lead editorial on 28 November 1952, *The Washington Post* commented that "the overhauling of the National Security Council is one of the most pressing administrative problems awaiting General Eisenhower in January."

³²Robert Strausz-Hupé, and Stefan T. Possony, *International Relations*. New York: McGraw Hill, 1950, pp. 352 ff.

³³Cf. Somers, *op. cit.*, p. 233.

10. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE NSC

ORGANIZATIONAL structure alone will never insure effective results. On the other hand, a clear-cut plan of organization can make a hard job easier and, more to the point here, a seemingly hopeless job capable of a degree of direction and control otherwise impossible. On the question of the relative importance of good organization or good people, former Secretary of the Interior Ickes is credited with the best quote: "having both you can't miss - - -; with only one you are seriously handicapped - - -; without either - - - God help you."³⁴ The caliber of personnel of an organization and a large measure of the organization's effectiveness must reflect leadership. This is especially true of the NSC. From the White House must come the spark of interest, intellectual leadership, and drive that will create an atmosphere of action in which vital decisions can be made and executed.

Apart from intellectual leadership there is a real requirement for the clarification of the purpose, functions, and the internal structure and operating procedures of the NSC. It is almost universally recognized that James S. Lay, Jr., the present Executive Secretary of the NSC, has done a fine job within the framework of his currently prescribed duties. Keeping the interested parties informed of the workings of the Council and coordinating the papers that flow in and out of the Senior Staff are extremely important. But the machinery should be strengthened so that the best possible brains are put on the most vital issues—so that decisions are made after fullest consideration of all factors. Equally important, once decisions are made, there should be adequate follow-up and enforcement to ensure that every segment of

³⁴Harold L. Ickes, Plan of Organization, Organization Manual, Petroleum Administrator for War. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1943.

the Government supports national doctrine and policies.

On organizational concepts the NSC could well take a page from the JCS and the PSB by enlarging the responsibilities and changing the title of its Executive Secretary. Because of the wide range of functions of the NSC, no single department or man, other than the President himself, should be in complete control. But an arrangement more effective than the existing system is required to pull together and integrate conflicting interests, to follow up decisions and required actions in the name of the President, and continually to assess and evaluate on the broadest possible level the over-all foreign and military policies of the Government.

11. THE NSC STAFF DIRECTOR

WITHIN the framework of policy approved by the NSC, its Staff Director (a title suggested as more appropriate than Executive Secretary) should be allowed a high degree of initiative to act promptly and flexibly in execution of the Council's decisions. He should, for such purposes, report directly to the President and have the prestige that comes from working out of the President's office. The Director should be capable of action and decision within his authority, but he must also be methodical in the direction of long-range planning by his staff. He should be subordinate to the members of the NSC in their policy-making role, but he should have the full authority of the President to follow up and enforce decisions of the Council and to evaluate results achieved by all departments of the Government including those headed by Council members.

The position of Staff Director of the NSC requires infinite tact and resourcefulness. He must be effective without being autocratic; he must recognize that conflicts of ideas are healthy and may be the sources of new approaches to difficult problems; yet he must do all possible to force timely

decisions. He must avoid the two-edged sword of allowing the departments to feel that he has usurped some of their normal responsibilities, or of allowing himself to be submerged in the details of solving problems brought to him for solution.³⁵ The position of the NSC Staff Director must be more responsible and, therefore, more authoritative than that of an ordinary secretary of a general staff. He would be the executive head of the nation's most important general staff. This staff would not absorb any of the prerogatives of the President as Commander-in-Chief. It owes its existence to the fact that size and complexity of organization and the substantive problems involved make it impossible for one person or collegiate group of persons to do all the planning, coordinating, and supervising required to get proper results.

As a general rule the NSC Staff should confine itself to policy formulation and the development of over-all national strategy. It should not be drawn into activities which can properly be accomplished by the operating departments and agencies, but it must provide authoritative guidance on a medium and, if possible, a low level of abstraction. The Staff should have the following functions which cannot be delegated to operating agencies:

- a. The formulation of national objectives and national, foreign, and military policies.
- b. The development and promulgation of coordinated world-wide and regional strategy and programs designed to achieve the national objectives. (Of course, the resources of all departments should be utilized and not duplicated by the NSC Staff, but there should be no questions as to the authority and responsibility of the NSC Staff to produce this requirement.)
- c. Research and analysis as required. This includes specific items as directed by the Council as well as other items as determined by the NSC Staff Director to be appropriate for consideration by the Council. Research facilities of every department of the Government must be open and available for this purpose.
- d. The NSC Staff Director should function as the Executive Secretary of the Council *only while it is in session*. He should assist the chairman in conducting the meetings by coordinating and preparing the agenda and by recommending

³⁵Cf. Somers, *op. cit.*, p. 227.

solutions and decisions for consideration by the Council.

e. General guidance and direction to the detailed planning and programming of the departments and agencies.

f. Promulgation of decisions of the Council and follow up with the "action" departments to insure prompt and effective action. This follow-up is in the name of the President in his capacity as the chairman of the Council and should insure that the departments are responsive to discipline from the White House.

g. Continual evaluation and appraisal from an over-all point of view of "objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States in relation to our actual and potential power for the purpose of making recommendations to the President"—(as required by the Act creating the NSC).

h. Other duties related to the functions of the Council as directed by the President.

The major job of the NSC Staff is planning on the national level, that is, the formulation of national objectives, strategies, policies, and programs as guidance to the operating agencies. The planning function might be accomplished by organizing the NSC Staff into two major groups. The two major groups may be called the Objectives or Strategy Group and the Plans and Programs Group. The Strategy Group should sit at the call of the Director and be chaired by him. Its permanent membership should consist of the best planning brains of the Government and a small group of professionally-skilled full-time consultants drawn from private life. In addition, regional and functional specialists may sit with the Group as required by the subject of discussion. From the Strategy Group the most imaginative and constructive thinking should emerge. It is here that the national objectives and strategies are considered as a whole, and the framework is produced upon which further building can be designed without destruction of the building's foundation.

Once long-range national objectives and strategies are formulated and approved by the Council, intermediate objectives are adopted; and strategic moves to attain them are set in motion and continuously followed. At this point the Plans and Programs Group should take the initiative. The bulk of the PSB staff, supplemented by strength on the military side, might well fit into this group whose main job

it would be to transpose the broad language of national objectives and strategy into realistic guidance, devoid of abstractions and generalities, which will control the operating departments and agencies. Closely related to, if not a part of this Group, should be the follow-up function—a *sine qua non* to effective performance.

Additional details as to the composition, size, and operating methods of the NSC Staff are beyond the scope of this paper. It is clear that full-time effort should replace some of the part-time arrangements now in effect. Strong direction and follow-up, within approved policies, rather than coordination among the departments, should set the tone of the Staff Director and his staff. To accomplish these duties the strength of the NSC Staff must be increased both in quality and quantity. But the strengthening of the NSC Staff should not result in another echelon between the President and the actual points of operation. Rather, there should be less layering and certainly no increase in total personnel concerned with these matters.

The NSC Staff should consolidate under a manageable arrangement the many and diverse staff elements—some of which are now deep in the bowels of State, Defense, and other departments—that under present conditions are working hard on the functions that can more effectively be handled at the NSC level. The difference will be that instead of writing great volumes of staff papers on the “position” of their office *vis-a-vis* a particular problem, they may now turn attention to the position of the United States Government as a whole on the same matters. Washington has seen too many staff papers representing the position of a particular agency or office on a particular problem and too few staff papers outlining the over-all posture of the United States Government. Of course, the latter are infinitely more difficult to produce, but this difficulty is rarely lessened by increasing the volume of papers of the former type.

The proposal to create the position of Staff Director of the NSC and to give him the means and authority to make the Council a more useful tool of the President is no doubt subject to the familiar objection that too much authority is given to one man. The same arguments raised against the creation of the General Staff of the Army in 1903 will no doubt be raised against this proposal. In fact the arguments

against the General Staff some fifty years ago ring familiar with today's arguments against any greater degree of unification of the armed services or a proposal to put strength and teeth in the NSC.³⁶ There is nothing so dear to vested interests as weakness and indecision on the part of anyone with higher authority. The hearings on the National Security Act of 1947 gave ample evidence of a fear of the concentration of great power in one individual. Congress seemed to feel that no one individual is as well-qualified as a group to make decisions. Each member of that group would, of course, be trained in one of the different types of problems involved.³⁷ Unfortunately, our problems are not divisible into neat separate components corresponding to the extent of authority we are willing to entrust to one man, and *decisions* rather than extended considerations are required for existence of the nation in the second half of the twentieth century. Furthermore such objections ignore the constitutional authority of the President. The Chief Executive may never divest himself of ultimate responsibility, but he may certainly delegate authority. Efficiency requires that he do so. The President is also duty-bound either to reassign or reassume that delegated authority should it be disabused.

12. TRANSFER OF THE PSB STAFF TO THE NSC

WITH the strengthening of the staff of the NSC in the manner indicated, its functions will overlap many of the present functions of the PSB which was created in part because the NSC did not meet the requirements for national guidance in the increasingly important field of psychological warfare. In order for the PSB to function it has been neces-

³⁶Nelson, *op. cit.*, p. 569 ff. For excellent discussion of related subject see Col Richard P. Klocko, *An Air Force Concept of Joint Command*, which is Air War College Studies No. 1 (Confidential), Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press, 1954.—Ed.
³⁷Lt. Colonel Roy C. Heflebower, "Unification and the Joint Chiefs of Staff," Thesis, Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, 1949.

sary for its staff to duplicate and in some cases substitute its efforts for the vacuum left by lack of action or decision by the NSC. This was necessary in order for the PSB staff to form a basis for further development of policies and programs in the psychological-warfare field. Thus, the actual work of the two agencies is at least partially merged in practice, although the organizational chart (Chart 1) clearly shows the PSB as separate from the NSC.

Especially during a period of conventional military build-up, cold-war operations are the primary methods of attaining the nation's objectives and should be directed from the highest levels of the Government.³⁸ While a national military staff may be justifiably separate from the over-all national staff, the same is not true as to a separate staff for cold-war efforts. It follows that the PSB might well be abolished and its functions assumed by the NSC. Adjustments as to the assignment and use of the present staff personnel of the PSB can be made on the basis of detailed studies of the requirements for the revitalized NSC Staff. Obviously, to the extent that administrative and housekeeping functions of the PSB (such as space, personnel, external relationships, etc., which seem to require such a high proportion of the time of Washington executives) are duplicated in the NSC, merger should result in an increase in efficiency with less personnel.

The total job of formulating national objectives, strategies, and policies can be done better and cheaper by locating it at the level of decision, and by merging all staff elements of the entire Government concerned with such matters with the clear mandate that once decisions are made the approved programs will be executed without the mass of "position papers" for each affected agency with which Washington is now afflicted. The statutory position of the NSC puts it in a better position to get its decisions accepted by the military than did the Executive Order status of the PSB which, as we have seen, tends to be ignored by the JCS in cases of disagreement.

The history of the creation of the PSB is a good illustration of why so many boards, commissions, *ad hoc* committees, etc., exist in Washington. The basic defect was the lack

³⁸For an interesting discussion of this point, see James Burnham, *The Coming Defeat of Communism*. New York: John Day, 1950, p. 243, ff.

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
of performance on the part of the NSC. There was a felt need for guidance and evaluation of the national cold-war effort. Being unable to get action at the NSC level, the agencies most concerned with the problem proposed and secured approval for creation of an additional agency to do that part of the job in which they were most interested. But the substitution of the Under Secretaries of State and Defense for the secretaries of those departments, and the addition of the Director of the CIA as a member carry no magic. Indeed, they comprised one step further removed from the decision-making level, and their time is almost as fully occupied with normal duties of the departments as are their chiefs. The Director of CIA is, of course, in a position to act for and commit his agency but properly he has been hesitant to fill in blank policies which are the responsibility of his superior—the NSC. In any event the nature of the decisions that must be taken by the Nation's cold-war general staff are such that direct access to the President is required. This was recognized in General Eisenhower's San Francisco speech of 8 October 1952.³⁹

13. THE COMMAND POST AND THE
PRESIDENT'S CHAIN OF COMMAND

As is pointed out above, the problem of overseas organization of the United States Government has been recognized, and the President has been required by the Military Security Act of 1951 to "prescribe procedure to assure coordination" of foreign, military, economic, and diplomatic activities. It is too much to expect that complete harmony will exist between military theater commanders and State Department diplomats overseas who receive their guidance through different channels and sources which are not properly integrated at home. An American theater com-

³⁹The New York Times, January 11, 1953, p. 1.

chart 2



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mander has greater latitude than has the theater commander of any other nation. The closest historical approximation to him is the Roman proconsul.⁴⁰ The theater commander's role in time of war far exceeds his obligations to the JCS for military operations. He is, in fact, the representative of the President of the United States, and overseas he carries a full projection of the executive function of the United States Government.⁴¹ While the major function of the theater commander may be military, this official should not be regarded as under the exclusive command of the military fountainhead which is the JCS.

Should the NSC Staff be changed into a true national staff, the President would be immeasurably assisted in carrying out his dual role as the nation's military commander in chief and its political head. By designating the NSC as his national command post the President could use the NSC Staff as a vital tool in achieving national unity of command, including military, economic, and political forces. Under such a national command structure—see Chart 2—the State and Defense Departments would continue to supervise and guide the activities of both our foreign diplomatic missions and our theater commanders within the policies established by the NSC. In fact only minor procedural changes are required, but it is important for all to understand that the responsibilities of the departments are those of functional staffs or executive agents of the President and not as commanders of any overseas element. Orders to overseas elements initiated by any agency of the Government should pass through the State or Defense departmental machinery, depending upon which department has executive-action responsibility for the activity abroad. But such orders are those of the President, even though issued by one or more of his staff elements (departments). For example, guidance to theater commanders on political matters are not only the right, but the urgent duty of the State Department, and the same applies to other Washington agencies which have primary responsibility for a segment of the nation's policies and activities.

The ultimate responsibility for coordination of guidance and direction to the overseas elements belongs to the Presi-

⁴⁰Rienhardt and Kintner, *op. cit.*, p. 727.

⁴¹Ibid. cit.

dent. To assist him in this responsibility he should use the NSC Staff which services his National Command Post. The Staff should monitor the more important directives issued by the departments and work out appropriate adjustments to insure consonance. Departments should coordinate among themselves as much as possible, but in case of differences that cannot be resolved between the parties in the national interest, the case should go to the NSC Staff for decision. In this manner the alternatives of no decision or watered-down compromises can be avoided.

American ambassadors to foreign countries are appointed by and represent the person of the President of the United States. The State Department has properly assumed the responsibility for guiding and directing the foreign missions, and orders from the Secretary of State are accepted abroad as orders from the President. With the indistinction between peace and war and between political and military policies and decisions, it is important to insure complete integration of the President's conduct of foreign affairs and his responsibilities as military commander in chief.

Orders to overseas stations, especially in the cold war, usually involve related and mutually supporting actions by both State and Defense. These departments have control of the overseas logistical support bases required for an activity on a major scale. Hence it is vitally important that coordinated instructions go out to theater commanders and military missions *through* the JCS, and to diplomatic missions *through* the State Department. Timely coordinated instructions which are not watered-down compromises can rarely be produced by two coequal departments, each responsible for different national objectives. But an efficient NSC Staff can assure such production.

14. A NEW NATIONAL STAFF VS. IMPROVING THE EXISTING NSC STAFF

A NUMBER of students of the problem have advocated a new national staff or program coordinator to serve the President exclusively.⁴² These proposals seem to follow the Franklin D. Roosevelt theory of adding another organizational element above the ailing agency without considering the alternative of carving out the deadwood and bolstering up an otherwise sound structure.

In opposition to this proposal it may be stated that we need the best-possible men to head the Departments of State and Defense—not second-best men. Top-flight men would tolerate only a limited amount of control and direction on subjects which are largely their own responsibility. They would take orders from the President, but they would not want to be subordinated to some “deputy president.”

But no department head may properly object to thorough consideration of recommendations made by a body such as the NSC Staff, especially when he knows that he will have a chance to speak his piece before a decision is made. Neither can there be valid objections to the establishment of any machinery the President may desire when that machinery is designed to force *decisions* instead of *consideration* on matters where inaction may be worse than the wrong action. Also, follow-up by the NSC Director and his staff, on behalf of the President, to enforce the Council's decisions and to evaluate the results thereof cannot be subject to rational objection by any cabinet officer.

It does not seem necessary, then, to create a separate national staff reporting directly and solely to the President. However, if experience should demonstrate that subordi-

⁴²Here see Somers, *op. cit.*, p. 227, ff.

nation of the NSC Staff Director to the policy control of the NSC members tends to perpetuate *consideration* and *prevent decisions* on a timely basis, then the NSC Staff Director should be made responsible solely to the President. If cabinet members cannot place the over-all interest of the nation above the interest of their own departments, their own control over national policies and strategy will then have to be weakened.

15. SUMMARY

THE most serious defect of our traditional conduct of foreign policy has been the lack of coordination of political, economic, psychological, and military policies. We fought two world wars without giving much thought to the relation between the kind of military victory we were planning to win and the political settlement that would follow. In the latest one, which was a war of movement, our concentration on purely military objectives did help to win the wars quickly, cheaply, and thoroughly. But this military efficiency was achieved at the expense of larger postwar considerations.

Under modern conditions military questions are so interwoven with economic, political, and social phenomena that it is doubtful that a purely military strategy exists. In recent years we have come to realize that only over-all guidance can coordinate global war. For such war is fought as bitterly in the realm of ideas, and in the field of economics, and in underground activity, as it is in the actual clash of military forces. Yet, despite the larger number of staff elements in Washington, there is no adequate national staff to integrate all national policies into a single grand strategy for the nation.

The NSC, created in 1947 in recognition of the need for integration of political and military policies of the nation, has functioned better than any previous organization designed for this purpose. That it has functioned at all sets it apart from earlier efforts. Its accomplishments are largely in dealing with matters of immediate urgency rather than in the provision of comprehensive and definite guidance. This is largely due to three factors: 1) the collegiate structure of the Council; 2) the absence of full-time aggressive leadership; and 3) the lack of adequate follow-up procedure.

The procedures followed by the Executive Secretary of the

Council are designed to insure full consideration of all possible viewpoints. But at this writing it is to be observed that consideration does not mean decision. At the NSC level, decisions are normally taken only by unanimous agreement of the council members or they are not taken at all. Policy decisions taken without adequate consideration may hurt grievously, but it is equally wrong, especially for a nation looked to for world leadership, to lose ground by default. There is no excuse for pure negligence—for failing to produce an adequate national policy or program to meet international issues.

The Psychological Strategy Board was established as a general staff for direction of the cold war. In its present form the PSB is one step further removed from the President than is the NSC. The decisions made by the nation's cold-war general staff must be taken at the highest level of the Government. It is the conviction of this observer that the PSB should be abolished and its functions transferred to a revitalized and reinforced NSC.

The effectiveness of the NSC can be improved by strengthening and increasing the authority of the NSC Staff. It must be able to achieve decisions on a timely basis that are not so watered down by compromise as to be worthless as guidance to the operating departments and agencies. The NSC Staff Director should function as a direct assistant to the President. Within the framework of approved policies, he should monitor the President's chains of command to the overseas stations (military and diplomatic) to insure consonance between the political posture of the nation and its military capabilities. He should actively follow up on the "action" departments, to insure that policies and programs are being executed, and to evaluate the results achieved against national objectives.

As this paper is completed (mid-January 1953) there is no doubt that the nation's newly elected leader is thoroughly aware of the nature of the conflict in which we are engaged in the second half of the twentieth century. There is an indication that he realizes the necessity for decisive coordinated action on the part of the United States. General Eisenhower's San Francisco speech of 8 October 1952 called for a revitalized National Security Council to develop a unified and coherent cold-war strategy. The able Robert Cutler, who

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assisted in writing the San Francisco speech (against a background of frustrating experiences as the Deputy Director of the PSB Staff), has been announced as one of the White House administrative assistants in the new administration. Out of General Eisenhower's own experience at top-level command should spring a new expression of appreciation for the necessity for timely decisions and guidance to the operating agencies, as the new administration, civilian and military, moves toward the making of grand strategy.

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Addendum,
1954

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A D D E N D U M

THE basic paper above was undertaken in the fall of 1952 and completed in the early weeks of 1953. It pointed up the need for integration of our politico-military policies; it described the operating methods and procedures of the NSC and related agencies under President Truman; and it made certain recommendations or suggestions for improvement. This addendum, written in January 1954, draws some comparisons between the recommendations made in the basic paper and developments made during the year which followed. The weaknesses of the NSC were becoming quite widely recognized at the time the basic paper was written. Doubtless, some corrective action would have been taken irrespective of the results of the national elections of November 1952.* Now, a year later, it is gratifying to note considerable improvement in that process of our Government which produces national security policies; but it must be noted also that the NSC machinery for implementing those national security policies is yet to be perfected.

The major recommendations in the basic paper were:

- a. To revitalize the NSC; to strengthen the NSC Staff and create the position of NSC Staff Director with direct access to the President and with responsibility and authority to make the Council a more useful tool of the President.
- b. To strengthen the decision-making process of the NSC—the Strategy Group of the NSC Staff.
- c. To strengthen the implementation and follow-up procedures of NSC and to transfer the Psychological Strategy Board to the NSC Staff as part of its Plans and Program Group.
- d. To clarify the chain of command from the President to our foreign, diplomatic, and military posts.

The progress made during the first year of the Eisenhower administration toward satisfying the needs pointed up in these recommendations is discussed *seriatim* below.

*[The author modestly fails to note that a copy of the basic paper was made available to a member of the White House secretariat in early February 1953.—Ed.]

1. REVITALIZATION OF THE NSC

THE attention and interest given to the machinery for the development of national security policies has been one of the significant features of President Eisenhower's first year in office. Not only have the procedures of the National Security Council been revamped, but the active interest and participation of the President as chairman of the NSC meetings and his reliance on this body as one of his primary tools has set the tone for interest and participation by the heads of the member departments and agencies. The Vice-President is assuming a significant role in the work of the Council. There is a current standing rule that all members and each advisor to the NSC will attend the weekly meetings in person. Presidential clearance is required for any substitution.

In addition to the statutory members, i.e. the President, the Vice President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, plus the Director of Foreign Operations Administration (who supersedes the old Director of Mutual Security), and the Director of Defense Mobilization (who supersedes the old Chairman of the National Security Resources Board), one important—very important—voice has been added to NSC deliberations. It is that of the Secretary of the Treasury who has been added as a "permanent-request" member of the council.

The President's cabinet, already somewhat shorn of its responsibilities in foreign affairs, surrendered nearly all remnants in this area to the seven-man NSC.

In this shift in responsibility there have been made some significant changes in the organizational structure of the White House strategy-making machinery. These are discussed below.


Immediately it must be noted, as it was in the basic paper,

that organizational structure is one thing; the personalities of those who fill "T/O slots" is another. It is not the purpose of this paper to attempt to characterize the individuals involved, but some mention of personality traits is inescapable.

The dominating contagion of the Eisenhower personality has supplied a type of leadership to the Council that had been missing before. The President's knowledge of how to create and use a staff has been a major factor in the revitalization of the National Security Council. The firm but pleasant Eisenhower, who welded the diverse national and service interests at SHAPE into a functioning unit, has met a similar challenge in the NSC. How well he is succeeding in this task will have an important bearing on the future, not only of this nation, but of western civilization itself.

The problem of diverse interests of the member departments of the NSC has not, and perhaps never can be completely resolved, but it is being subordinated to wider considerations. This is due in part to the President's leadership, but also to the ground rules which the NSC obviously has adopted for the guidance of its own members. Under these rules members of the Council are advisors to the President in their own personal right rather than as representatives of their respective departments or agencies. These members are enjoined to seek statesmanlike solutions rather than compromises of departmental positions. The Council obviously has likewise imposed or urged the same ground rules upon its subordinate or advisory agencies such as the Planning Board of NSC, the new Operations Coordinating Board, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

chart 3



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Dwight D. Eisenhower



Robert Cutler
Special Assistant
to the President for
National Security
Affairs



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John Foster Dulles
State

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Charles E. Wilson
Defense



Harold E. Stassen
FOA



Arthur S. Flemming
ODM



George M. Humphrey
Treasury



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James S. Lay Jr.
Executive Secretary

S. Everett Allen Jr.
Deputy
Executive Secretary

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Adm. Arthur W. Radford



Gen. Nathan F. Twining



Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway

T
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C
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A



Allen W. Dulles

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Lt. Gen. Charles P. Cabell

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Walter B. Smith
State



Roger M. Kyes
Defense



Allen W. Dulles
CIA



Harold E. Stassen
FOA



C. D. Jackson
Presidential Representative



Elmer B. Staats
Executive Officer

O P E R A T I O N S C O O R D I N A T I N G B O A R D

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Approved For Release 2001/08/29 : CIA-RDP78-04718A001800100002-1
NSC PLANNING BOARD



Robert Cutler
Chairman



Robert R. Bowie
State



Frank C. Nash
Defense



Elbert P. Tuttle
Treasury

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NSC PLANNING BOARD



Robert W. Porter
Foreign Operations Administration



William Y. Elliott
Office of Defense Mobilization



Maj. Gen. John K. Gerhart
Advisor-Defense



Robert Amory
Advisor-CIA

2. STRENGTHENING OF THE NSC STAFF

SIGNIFICANT steps were taken in 1953 toward the creation of a true National Staff as a part of the NSC organization. The recommended position of NSC Staff Director has in effect been created. Specifically the title given to this director is Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. This, in fact, denotes a position of even higher prestige and strength than that proposed in the basic paper.

Again, it is worth noting not only the position but the personality of the incumbent. The President appointed to this key job Robert Cutler, a Boston lawyer-banker. This able man, who had risen to the rank of Brigadier General during wartime service, is a charming, vigorous bachelor who devotes full time to his job. As a key member of the White House official family, he has constant direct access to the President, and apparently enjoys the latter's complete confidence.

The Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs is the NSC's executive officer. He is also Chairman of the highly important Planning Board which replaced the old Senior NSC Staff. He personally briefs the President. With the latter's approval he fixes the agenda of the Council meetings. He does not preside at any Council meeting, but he sits at the apex of the machinery of the Council, just beneath the Council itself. There he is in a position to influence strongly both the policy-making process (as Chairman of the Planning Board) and the progress of implementation of policies (by receiving the reports of the Operations Coordinating Board). In addition he supervises (but is not a member of) the permanent staff of the NSC under the Executive Secretary.

James S. Lay, Jr., who served as Executive Secretary of the NSC under President Truman, has been continued with the

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same title under the new administration. Mr. Lay and his small staff, the Office of the Executive Secretary, have become the permanent secretariat of the Council. They, unlike the members of the Planning Board, are civil service employees and are unaffected by change in administration. The duties of this secretariat are just what the term implies: it assists the NSC to do its work by assuming responsibility for office facilities, internal budgets and personnel matters. It does not try to make policies; it is an important part of the machinery used by the Planning Board and the Council in policy formulation. The important job of processing the papers (agenda, records of action, status reports, etc.) which are the life-blood of the work of the NSC falls squarely upon the Executive Secretary to the Council. He is the official channel of communications for the NSC.

The Planning Board and The Office of the Executive Secretary are the principal elements of the Council's internal organization. (See Chart No. 3.) In addition to certain advisory committees, the machinery of the Council includes:

- a. The Joint Chiefs of Staff as the principal military advisors.
- b. The Central Intelligence Agency as the intelligence advisor.
- c. The Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) which reports to the Council on the "integrated implementation of national security policies."
- d. The U.S. Information Agency which reports to the NSC (or in accordance with the President's specific directives).

As regards the recommendations in the basic paper for organization of the NSC Staff into two main elements, it is clear that the functions of the Planning Board follow closely those suggested for the Strategy Group. There is no clear counterpart to the recommended Plans and Program Group, although the functions of the OCB are developing along similar lines. This development is discussed below under the heading, "Implementation of National Security Policies."

3. THE PLANNING BOARD IN THE PROCESS OF DECISION-MAKING

THE creation of the Planning Board has been a major step in strengthening the decision-making process of the NSC. The duties of the Planning Board include the advance spadework for the development of appropriate NSC policies in draft form for consideration by the Council. As in the Council itself, the problem of diverse interest of the member departments is under reasonable control in the Board. The members of the Board are nominated by the heads of the member departments or agencies of the NSC, but the appointment to the Board is made by the President. This tends to direct the primary loyalties, not to the separate departments, but to the over-all national interest in the form of the NSC. Members of the Planning Board are usually on the Assistant Secretary level of authority.

The work of the Planning Board is the principal duty of its members. No other duty may interfere. Nevertheless, one of the obvious ground rules for the nomination and appointment of a Planning Board member is that he shall have the personal confidence of the head of the member department or agency and the authority of such head to use its resources to perform appropriate board functions. In addition, the Board member must have an unbreakable engagement to brief the head of his department or agency before every Council meeting as to the background of the problems that will appear on the agenda.

Instead of the old Senior NSC Staff method of "keeping the subject under discussion until the disputes are resolved" the new system calls for a full and earnest exchange of conflicting opinions subject to the overriding objective of producing a truly national policy. Conflicting viewpoints are

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not necessarily submerged or eliminated. Under current practice, the Planning Board may present the NSC with a number of alternatives, or certain unresolved points may be included in papers that go to the NSC for discussion. Out of the discussion of the alternatives, agreement often comes on one or a combination of such policies or courses of action. The philosophy of the new NSC is to face up to the major world issues with an attitude of decision. This usually results in elimination or at least reconciliation of conflicting points of view.

**4. IMPLEMENTATION OF
NATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES**

OF the two major functions of the NSC, decision-making and the programming or implementation of decisions, the former naturally receives primary attention from the new administration. Yet the latter, in the long run, is just as vital to national security. It is hard enough to meet squarely the difficult problems of national security with appropriate policies and courses of action. It is physically far more difficult to program and execute such policies against the hard internal realities of budget, manpower, and materiel limitations as well as the external factors of Kremlin aggression and autocratic effectiveness. These functions then are inseparable—the “Siamese twins” of national security. Neither may be neglected.

One of the prescribed duties of the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, in his capacity of executive officer of the NSC, is to bring to the attention of the President, with recommendations for appropriate action, lack of progress on the part of an agency in carrying out a particular policy assigned to it. The Special Assistant would not bother the President here unless he had found it to be

impossible to expedite performance at the Planning Board level. This prescribed procedure seems to give the Council's executive officer sufficient authority to inspect, require reports, and to follow up the execution of approved policies. The machinery of follow-up is beginning to function, but it has not been in effect long enough to permit a complete evaluation of its effectiveness.

Included with the document announcement of the President's approval of an NSC proposed policy are directives for implementation of that policy. These are forwarded to appropriate departments and agencies. In cases where more than one agency is concerned (the majority of cases), the President designates a coordinating agency which is responsible for: (1) notifying all departments of the actions for which each is responsible; (2) insuring that such actions are taken in a coordinated manner; and (3) transmitting progress reports on implementation. The Operations Coordinating Board established by Executive Order No. 10483, is normally designated as this coordinating agency. The primary purpose of the Board is to "insure coordinated implementation of national security policies." For policies assigned for coordination, the Board is directed to advise with the departments and agencies concerned as to operational planning responsibilities, the coordination of interdepartmental aspects of such plans, and their execution in such manner as to make the fullest contribution to national security objectives. In addition, the Board may initiate new proposals for action in appropriate circumstances.

The membership of the Operations Coordinating Board is as follows: Under-Secretary of State, chairman; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration; the Director of Central Intelligence; and a representative of the President. The latter official, C. D. Jackson (former editor of *Fortune*), is known in Washington as the "President's assistant for Cold War." Although the Board normally reports to the President through the NSC machinery, Mr. Jackson's membership thereon provides direct access to the Chief Executive in appropriate cases.*

Of great importance to the functioning of the Board in recent months is its executive officer, a position occupied by

*[Mr. Jackson resigned his post on the White House staff in early March 1954. No successor had been appointed as this went to press.—Ed.]

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Elmer Staats, formerly with the Bureau of the Budget. Within a short time after Staats' arrival in November 1953, there was a discernible improvement in the functioning of the Board's internal machinery. He has been largely responsible for the orderly development of the procedures to make the Board an effective instrument.

The executive order establishing the Operations Coordinating Board also abolished the old Psychological Strategy Board and directed the former to wind up the outstanding affairs of the latter. The effect of this order was to transfer the personnel, files, and other assets of the PSB to the OCB. Initially the operating procedures of the OCB followed the panel system of the PSB whereby representatives of the several agencies met periodically to produce additional papers which duplicated, at least in part, the national intelligence estimates as well as some of the staff studies of the Planning Board of the NSC. By December 1953, however, the OCB had adopted its own internal operating procedures pointed more directly at its job of "integrated implementation" of national security policies.

For each of the NSC papers wherein the President designates the OCB as the coordinating agency, the current procedure provides for the appointment of a "Working Group" of representatives of the affected agencies. Normally the "Working Group" is chaired by the representative of the agency having the most direct interest. The executive secretary of the working group is furnished from the staff of the OCB. The Operations Coordinating Board issues "Standing Instructions for Working Groups." These specify the jobs of the several working groups as they proceed toward implementation of national policy. The instructions make clear that the responsibility for operations implementing these NSC policies remains with the agencies concerned. The working group is the mechanism through which is conducted such inter-agency coordination and reporting on NSC policies as require unusual or nonroutine development beyond a single department. The number and duration of meetings of the working groups are held to a minimum, informal contacts between members being encouraged as the normal method of doing business.

The reason for the establishment of the working groups, then, was to make clear which agency had what responsibili-

ties under the concerned NSC policy. Each working group seeks "completeness of and mutual support among the agency programs developed in response to such responsibilities and the timely and coordinated execution of such programs in such manner as to make the fullest contribution to national security." The working groups are apparently intended to be the channel of operational reporting by the responsible agencies on the status, manner, and degree of implementation of NSC policies. The OCB then consolidates such reports and transmits them to the NSC at appropriate times.

The OCB has made a good start toward accomplishing its purposes. Its membership, at the undersecretary level, is appropriate to its function of "implementation" in contrast to top-level membership of the NSC which is responsible for "policy making." Its standard instructions for working groups is a significant advance over the old panel system of the PSB.

But the working group can hardly insure "completeness of and mutual support among agency operational programs" in the absence of some over-all framework in the form of an outline of a "National Plan" into which document each agency can set forth its programs of action. Development of such an outline is distinct from the job of the Planning Board of the NSC (which is concerned with the development of policy). Rather the compilation of such an outline would be the responsibility of OCB (which is concerned with implementation of policy). This national plan would be quite distinct from a summary of national policy. It would in effect be a broad outline of planned procedures for carrying out the sum-total of national policy.

Admittedly the compiling of such a master plan would be quite difficult. Yet such is badly needed; and the continuous revision of such a national plan would also be needed. This process of continuous revision would be of primary assistance in limiting overlap and duplication and in filling in gaps. With a coversheet produced by the OCB, using the plans of the member agencies as tabs, the resultant document would be a "national plan of action" for a specific period of time (preferably a fiscal year).

The national plan would provide a proper basis against which the "mutual support among agency operational pro-

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grams" could be judged. Such a document would eliminate many of the *ad hoc* procedures and provide for a more complete utilization of national assets. This might also facilitate the development of a national command post for the President as suggested in the basic paper.

5. THE CHAIN OF COMMAND
FROM THE PRESIDENT
TO THE OVERSEAS STATIONS

As a corollary to transforming the NSC Staff into a true National Staff, the basic paper suggested that the President's command line should run directly from the White House to the overseas diplomatic posts and to theater commanders. This would place the departments in Washington in a staff position with the NSC Staff as the coordinator. Obviously, this could be done only with a greatly strengthened National Staff. There have been no developments in Washington during 1953 along these lines. Under the present arrangements the Secretaries of Defense and State and the Director of Foreign Operations Administration have their separate command lines to their separate field installations. However, joint field trips by the Secretary of State and the Director of Foreign Operations Administration have eliminated some of the duplication. Also, the increasing effectiveness of the OCB will serve to insure that the lines do not get crossed in the overseas station. With the various working groups of the OCB in daily informal contact, a mechanism now exists to iron out some of the difficulties that so often made us appear confused to our foreign friends.

6. SYNOPSIS

PRESIDENT EISENHOWER's campaign pledge of 1952 to revitalize the NSC has been carried out. His personal interest and leadership is reflected in the increased attention given to the formulation of national security policies by the other members of the Council. The Staff and the operating machinery of the Council have been strengthened. The key personality, aside from the President himself, is energetic Robert Cutler, the Council's executive officer and chairman of the Planning Board. Significant progress has been made in the submersion of the interests of the member departments into the wider interests of the Council.

The problem of insuring the implementation or execution of national security policies has also received attention. The Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) was created by Executive Order for the purpose of insuring coordinated implementation of national security policies. The OCB inherited the personnel and other assets of the old Psychological Strategy Board (PSB). By the end of 1953 the OCB had developed its own procedures and was in the process of organizing working groups of staff personnel from each of the agencies concerned with execution of national security policies. While OCB may be contemplating creation of "National Plans," over-all government-wide plans to insure integrated execution of policy, there has been no announcement of intention to take such a broad approach to the problem. Yet, the members of the working groups can hardly insure "completeness of and mutual support among agency operational programs" in the absence of some over-all framework of at least an outline of a National Plan into which each agency can design and fit its own program.

In final analysis, as this critique goes to press, it must be noted that during the first year of the Eisenhower adminis-

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tration substantial improvement was made in the processes whereby our national security policies are formulated. The Cabinet faded in significance before a revitalized NSC. The NSC organization structure was improved and vigorous men appointed to key staff positions. What immediately remains to be done is a similar strengthening of the processes whereby those policies are to be implemented—a comparable improvement in the machinery for achieving coordinated action.

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